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Enoch Powell remarks that 'there is no electoral pull in
"aid"'; to most people "aid" is positively and increasingly un-
popular'; hence, perhaps his opposition to it. But however
politically opportune, his views have a certain consistency.
Aid in the post-colonial world is seen in various ways as a
replacement for gunboats - serving a different purpose in the
view of liberal aid supporters, just as another weapon of fo-
reign policy in the view of conservative aid supporters (inclu-
ding most Western governments) and of radical critics.
In the past Powell, in his consistency, has been against
both gunboats and aid: he has opposed Eden at Suez, Wilson
and Heath east of it. He appears to be1ieve (wrongly) that
what happens in the Third World is not relevant to Western in-
terests; this littlest Englander of all implies that the people of
the Third World can be safely left to stew in their own under-
development and corruption until they perceive that 'the only
truly beneficent gift we have to offer is the example of what
made the West productive
- capitalism and enterprise'.
By contrast, part of Myrdal's theme is that 'the fact that
South Asia's freedom of action is now limited will . . . make a
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reversal of (existing) trends more difficult in the future and,
in any case, impossible of accomplishment without more radi-
cal government intervention than in the past' (p. 641). The
self-deception which can allow Powell to embrace Myrdal's
views as his own is truly breathtaking.
The two are at least as far apart on aid. Western style
economic growth, argues Powell, is impossible without revolu.-
tion: 'if such a revolution were to occur, it would render
"aid" superfluous; unless and until it does, "aid" implies an
arrogant presumption on the part of Western countries, an am-
bition to substitute one's own values for those of others'. But
Powell's indifference in the face of mass poverty, until the
miraculous conversion to capitalist virtues (shown by Myrdal
to have very limited use), is itself patently arrogant. What
presumably worries Powell is that aid has tended to support
state - rather than private - capitalism in South Asia. Unlike
Powell, Myrdal is a supporter of aid and would rightly consi-
der aid more useful the more his (not Powell's) social revolu-
tion got going.
But Myrdal's strictures against aid as it has been used
are in my view justified. The efficacy of aid depends (among
other things) on the nature of the society to which it goes;
thus in corrupt and inefficient societies 'some aid simply
feeds corruption and maintains inefficiency' (p. 636). Aid has
not been used to promote or support social revolution but as
the instrument of a foreign policy obsessed with "stability":
'In the interest of "stability", several corrupt governments in
South Asia have received substantial foreign assistance. These
facts of life make it very difficult for South Asians to under-
take those economic and political reforms essential for stimu-
lating growth and weeding out favouritisin and bribery. Any
pressure for internal reforms the donor country might apply
can easily be thwarted by the threat of collapse, the very
thing that foreign aid was designed to prevent' (p. 637). The
element of political blackmail in the aid relationship is not
one-sided; it involves the donor and the regime of the under-
developed country, but seldom its people.
Any critique of economic aid contending that. it is a sim-
ple weapon of the rich to bribe or blackmail the poor is im-
possibly crude. Very complex political mechanisms are at
work. Myrdal continually emphasis the crucial connection be-
tween the political and social system and the possibilities of
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economic progress. He says less about the reverse relation-
ship - how economic developments might effect social and poli-
tical changes Barrington Moore has speculated in this direc-
tion: If the agrarian programme of the present Indian govern-
ment fails to solve India's food probleme.,. . a political upheav-
al of some sort will become highly likely. But it will not
necessarily take the form of a communist-led peasant revolu-
tion, A turn to the right or fragmentation along regional line
or some combination of these two, seems much more probable
in the light of India's social structure' (Social Origins of Die-
t:atorship and Democraçy, p. 482). In practice what has been
relevant here is the combination of the Indian government' s
agrarian programme and American food aid, The links be-
tween food aid and political stability are very complex. The
absence of food aid might have hastened political upheaval; or,
as many people have maintained, the absence of aid might have
forced a more radical and successful programme on the govern-
ment,
Writing about Pakistan, Gustav Papanek has concluded
that 'at least over the next decade, an end to loans and grants
would stop any substantial increase in per capita income under
Pakistan's present economic and_political system' (Pakistan's
Development, p. 240, my emphasis) This is not to say for
certain that the same rate of growth could be achieved under
any other possible political system. It makes clear, however,
that there is an involved relationship between aid, the rate of
economic progress, economic policy and the political system.
Where aid is small, its removal may allow growth to continue
at the same rate with no more than, say, a marginal increase
in taxes, Where aid is great, its removal could involve far-
reaching political changes which are hard to predict; some of
these may be desirable, others undesirable, regardless of the
motives for the aid.
These are facts about aid, not in themselves a criticism
of it. But some conclusions do emerge from these facts.
First, the step from 'X gives aid to Y' to 'aid prevents desir-
able social change' is not a simple one; the intervening pre-
misses must be stated. It must be a matter for careful judg-
ment whether in practice the political effects of aid have been
good or bad and whether its ending would lead (perhaps by a
very devious route) to more progressive social structures.
Second, where aid does disguise the need for reforms, it can,
as Myrdal shows, entrench the forces opposed to reform; "sta
bility" ma then only be achievable at the cost of progressively
expanding aid commitments which no Western donor seems at
present prepared for, Third, while Myrdal supports multilat
eral aid in which 'the political element is less pronounced'(p. 637), aid from international sources is as much tied up with
politics as bilateral aid, though the connection may be less
crude. The World Bank as creditor must be as interested in
"stability" as any government - perhaps more so,as it comes to
rely for its capital exclusively on borrowing in the capital
markets of the West; its very existence depends on its ability
to honour its debts. It can less afford defaults than govern-
ments; on the other hand, it is not so obliged to react against
the expropriation of private capital by cutting off aid.
McNamara's announcement on September 30 of a massive
World Bank programme and the virtual certainty of a Nixon/
Wallace ITS Congress make it probable that for the next five
years most aid will be international. Could a new regime of
international aid afford to concentrate its assistance upon
those countries which are making genuine progress towards a
rapid change in social, political, and economic power? If so,
(though I am pessimistic), aid could redeem itself. It is the
notion of aid as a reward for "good" behaviour which is the
real arrogance, not the idea of aid itself.
